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Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust 
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion in Whitman v. American 
Trucking Associations, Inc.1 that “Congress. . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”2  
This statement promotes the idea that if Congress intended to make a 
significant change to a statute and the implications of the statute, it would 
not do so in a way that is mysterious and unpronounced.3  In Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust,4 the Supreme Court of the United 
States had to determine congressional intent when Congress altered the 
definition of the word “state” for the purposes of Bankruptcy Code.5  The 
provision that is the center of the question presented is Section 903(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, which states: 
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a state to control, 
by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the 
exercise of the political or governmental powers of such 
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but . . . a 
State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of 
such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent 
to such composition . . . .6 
In his oral argument, Christopher Landau, the attorney for the 
petitioners, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Melba Acosta-Febo, 
advanced the position that both views of the amended definition of “state” 
would create an “elephant-in-a-mousehole” situation.7  The petitioners 
argued that Congress would not have left Puerto Rico without any recourse 
for adjusting their municipal debts without expressly saying so.8  However, 
the respondents stated that Congress would not have provided Puerto Rico 
 
 1. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
 2. Id at 468. 
 3. Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 4. 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) [hereinafter Puerto Rico]. 
 5. Id at 1942. 
 6. 11 U.S.C.A. § 903(1) (West through P.L. 114-219); see Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 8. See id at 6-7. 
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with the right to enact their own bankruptcy debts, while denying that right 
to every other state.9  Upon consideration of both of these arguments, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held in a 5-2 decision that Section 
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code applies to Puerto Rico within the definition 
of the word “state.”10  As such, the Court determined that Congress left 
Puerto Rico without any recourse for restructuring its debts.11 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 2014, Puerto Rico enacted the Puerto Rico Corporation Debt 
Enforcement and Recovery Act (Recovery Act).12  This Act helps the Public 
Utilities of Puerto Rico implement a restructuring plan for their debts so 
they will not default.13  The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico finds itself in 
the midst of climbing financial woes, as more than $20 billion of its debt 
can be attributed to three government-owned public utilities companies.14  
These companies are: the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority; the Puerto 
Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority; and the Puerto Rico Highways and 
Transportation Authority.15  Upon creating these government-owned public 
utilities, the relevant legislation allowed the companies to issue bonds to 
operate the companies.16  By implementing the Puerto Rico Corporation 
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, the Commonwealth passed legislation 
replicating Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.17  Specifically, Chapter 2 of 
the Recovery Act creates a procedure for “consensual” modification of 
debts where the public utilities can propose changes to the terms of their 
outstanding debt instruments.18  Furthermore, in addition to proposing debt 
modification, the utility must propose a bank-approved recovery plan to 
regain financial stability.19  This modification will be binding if those who 
hold at least 50% of the affected debt agree to the modifications.20  After the 
Act was enacted into law, Franklin Templeton and Oppenheimer financial 
firms sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, specific Commonwealth 
 
 9. See id. at 27-28. 
 10. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 11. Id. at 1954. 
 12. Id. at 1943. 
 13. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 7, Franklin California 
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221, 
15-1271, 15-1272). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
 16. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 11, Franklin California 
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221, 
15-1271, 15-1272). 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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officials, and the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”).21  
Subsequently, BlueMountain Capital Management, LLC sued the 
Commonwealth’s governor and other officials.22  Franklin Templeton and 
Oppenheimer sought a declaration that the Recovery Act was preempted by 
the Federal Bankruptcy Code.23  BlueMountain alleged that “any 
prospective enforcement of” the Act would violate the Contract Clause of 
the Puerto Rico Constitution, go against the Bankruptcy and Contract 
Clauses of the federal Constitution, and be preempted by federal law.24  The 
District Court then consolidated the cases and issued a decision.25  In its 
decision, the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico held 
that the federal Bankruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rico’s Recovery Act, and 
as such, is void pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution.26  The District Court permanently enjoined the 
Commonwealth from implementing the Recovery Act.27  The decision of 
the District Court was appealed.28  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision.29  The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals wrote, “The prohibition now codified at Section 903(1) 
has applied to Puerto Rico since the predecessor of that section’s enactment 
in 1946.  The statute does not currently read, nor does anything about the 
1984 amendment suggest, that Puerto Rico is outside the reach of Section 
903(1)’s prohibitions.”30  The Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit.31 
III. THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE 
1. The Majority Opinion 
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, with whom Chief 
Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer, and Justice Kagan 
 
 21. Appellate Brief of the Defendants-Appellants Melba Acosta-Febo at 5, Franklin California 
Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1218, 15-1221, 
15-1271, 15-1272). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 85 F. Supp. 3d 577, 
586 (D.P.R. 2015). 
 26. Id. at 613. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d at 325. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1941. 
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joined.32  Justice Alito took no part in the consideration of the case.33  The 
majority opinion began by discussing the relevant bankruptcy provisions, 
focusing on three main provisions: the “who may be a debtor” provision in 
Section 109(c), the pre-emption provision in Section 903(1), and the 
definition of “state” in Section 101(52).34  Justice Thomas began by looking 
at the text and history of these provisions, first by citing the Constitution, 
which empowers Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”35  Further, Justice Thomas 
stated that Congress entered into the field of municipal bankruptcy in 
1933.36  The Supreme Court struck down Congress’ first attempt at creating 
municipal bankruptcy law, the Court stated that Congress infringed on the 
States’ power to, “manage their own affairs.”37  Justice Thomas asserted 
that it is critical to the constitutionality of municipal bankruptcy laws that 
the State has the first say in authorizing the entity to seek relief.38  However, 
the states do not enjoy unlimited power; in a 1946 amendment, Congress 
made it so that federal bankruptcy laws preempt state municipal bankruptcy 
laws.39  Finally, discussing the provision defining a “state,” in 1984 
Congress amended the definition of the word “state” to say that “the term 
‘State’ includes the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, except for the 
purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title.”40  It 
is uncontested that, before 1984, Puerto Rico was a “state” for the purpose 
of Chapter 9’s preemption provision; accordingly, before 1984, the 
Bankruptcy Code would have preempted the Recovery Act, because it was a 
state law that would restructure debts that would bind non-consenting 
creditors.41  The majority held that the respondents had a better 
interpretation of § 903(1).42  Justice Thomas stated quite simply that the text 
of the Bankruptcy Code is both the beginning and end of the analysis.43  He 
went on to state that, “The amended definition of ‘State’ excludes Puerto 
Rico for the single ‘purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 
9 of this title.’  That exception unmistakably refers to the gateway provision 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 35. Id. (citing US CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. (citing Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 531 
(1936)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1945. 
 40. Id. at 1943 (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(52) (West through P.L. 114-254)). 
 41. Id. at 1945. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1946. 
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in § 109, titled ‘who may be a debtor.’”44  However, while Puerto Rico is 
not a state for defining who may be a debtor; that does not mean that Puerto 
Rico is excluded from all Chapter 9 provisions.45  The exclusion from 
defining debtors is simply that—an exclusion—but it does not bar Puerto 
Rico from any other provisions contained in the Bankruptcy Code.46  Justice 
Thomas argued that “The text of the definition extends no further.”47  Next, 
the majority opinion discussed the arguments made in the dissenting 
opinion.48  The first of these arguments is that if Puerto Rico is excluded 
from the gateway provision, this is the gateway into Chapter 9, and if Puerto 
Rico is excluded from the gateway provision, it follows that the 
Commonwealth is excluded from Chapter 9 in its entirety.49  However, this 
argument was not well taken by the majority.  Specifically, Justice Thomas 
argued: 
That Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway 
provision, however, says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a 
‘State’ for the other provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.  
The States do not ‘pass through’ the gateway provision.  The 
gateway provision is instead directed at the debtors themselves—
the municipalities, in the case of Chapter 9 bankruptcy.  A 
municipality that cannot secure state authorization to file a Chapter 
9 provision is excluded from Chapter 9 entirely.  But the same 
cannot be said about the State in which that municipality is 
located.50 
Further, the majority held that the gateway provision only provides for 
which states can authorize municipalities to file for bankruptcy; it is not a 
requirement to enter into Chapter 9 as a whole.51  The court stated, “If it 
were Congress’ intent to also exclude Puerto Rico as a ‘State’ for purposes 
of that pre-emption provision, it would have said so.”52 
 
 44. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
 45. Id. at 1947. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1948. 
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2. Dissenting Opinion 
Justice Sotomayor, who was joined by Justice Ginsburg, issued the 
dissenting opinion.53  The dissent began by stating, “The structure of the 
Code and the language and purpose of § 903 demonstrate that Puerto Rico’s 
municipal debt restructuring law should not be read to be prohibited by 
Chapter 9.”54  The dissent took note of the financial crisis in Puerto Rico, 
noting the importance of bankruptcy law for debtors to get a “fresh start.”55  
Specifically, Justice Sotomayor noted that a business corporation can try to 
use bankruptcy as a means of reorganization, but if the reorganization were 
to fail, the corporation could default and go out of business.56  However, this 
is not a possibility for public utilities, as they provide water, electricity, and 
transportation to the public.57  If they were to default and shut down, it 
would leave the public to have to find these necessities for themselves.58  
The dissent then discussed the structure of the Bankruptcy Code, noting that 
it is to be read in its entirety starting with Chapter 1.59  Chapter 1 lays out 
how to read the Code by stating definitions and rules of construction.60  
Specifically, the Court noted that § 109, the “who may be a debtor” 
provision, details for each type of debtor which chapter they should follow 
for filing for bankruptcy, therefore gaining the title of the “gateway” 
provision.61  Following this logic, because a municipality in Puerto Rico 
cannot be authorized to file for municipal bankruptcy, the dissent argued 
that it followed that Puerto Rico would not access Chapter 9 because 
Chapter 1 states which chapter a debtor is to use, and Puerto Rico cannot 
use Chapter 9.62  Further, the dissent articulated: 
The question in these cases is whether § 903(1), a pre-emption 
provision in Chapter 9, still applies to Puerto Rico even though its 
municipalities are not eligible to pass through the ‘gateway’ into 
Chapter 9.  It should not.  Section 903 by its terms presupposes that 
Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the power to authorize 
their municipalities to invoke its protection.63 
 
 53. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1941. 
 54. Id. at 1949. 
 55. Id. at 1950. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1950. 
 59. Id. at 1951. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1952. 
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Additionally, the dissent argued that Section 903 is to be read in context, in 
order to see why it does not preempt the Recovery Act.64  As mentioned 
above, Section 903 provides for a reservation of powers for the States; 
however, the states are limited in their power, as “a State law prescribing a 
method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind 
any creditor that does not consent to such composition.”65  The dissent 
stated that this provision does not apply to Puerto Rico under the gateway 
provision.66  Specifically, “This understanding of § 903 is fundamentally 
confirmed by the careful gateway structure the Code sets out for 
understanding how its chapters work together.”67  The dissent placed 
significant importance upon the need to read the statutes in the context of 
the overall statutory scheme.68  Finally, the dissent addressed the majority’s 
argument that if Congress had intended to exclude Puerto Rico from 
Chapter 9 altogether, it would have said so.69  Notably, the dissent proffered 
a sticking point for this argument: 
[T]he Court ignores that Congress already altered the fundamental 
details of municipal bankruptcy when it amended the definition of 
‘State’ to exclude Puerto Rico from authorizing its municipalities to 
take advantage of Chapter 9.  Nobody has presented a compelling 
reason for why Congress would have done so, and the legislative 
history of the amendment is unhelpful.  Under either interpretation 
the scheme has been fundamentally altered by Congress.70 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Introduction 
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin Tax-Free Trust, the Supreme Court of the 
United States was presented with the issue of whether Puerto Rico could 
implement its own municipal bankruptcy laws, or if it was limited to 
seeking relief from Congress.71  The Court focused solely on the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code in making its decision.72  Notably, there is no legislative 
history to be offered for the relevant provisions, and as such, the Court was 
 
 64. Id. at 1951. 
 65. 11 U.S.C.A. § 903(1). 
 66. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1953. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1944. 
 72. Id. at 1946. 
7
Ciarlo: PUERTO RICO V. FRANKLIN CALIFORNIA TAX-FREE TRUST
Published by DigitalCommons@ONU,
248 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
limited to its reading of the text alone.73  During oral arguments, Justice 
Kagan stated that each side had a story as to what Congress intended to do 
in section 903(1).74  She indicated, “Both of you [counsel for respondents 
and petitioners] have stories about this, and it’s not—just not clear which of 
you is right.  And I guess what I most want to think about is this text.”75  As 
demonstrated by the majority and dissenting opinions, the reading of the 
text could result in varying outcomes.76  The reading of the text called for a 
careful balance of congressional intent in addition to a consideration of 
federalism.  Ultimately, the majority found that Congress would not have 
intended to give Puerto Rico a right that the states did not have, but rather 
Congress would have intended to put more of a limit on the Commonwealth 
and maintain control over the fiscal problems it faced.77 
The precedent set by this case may have some significance in future 
statutory interpretation cases as the majority rejected the statutory scheme 
argument and focused solely on the relevant provisions in isolation.  
Furthermore, beyond the notable precedential possibilities, the decision in 
Puerto Rico v. Franklin Tax-Free Trust could raise important federalism 
questions.  The decision also has a significant impact on what happens next 
in Puerto Rico.78 
B. Analysis 
1. Two Conflicting Views of Statutory Interpretation 
Both the majority and the dissent in this case focused on the text of the 
relevant statutory provisions.79  However, they each came to different 
conclusions regarding whether Puerto Rico was bound by the preemption 
provision in § 903(1).80  The majority adopted a narrow view of the 
definition of the definition of “state.”81  The majority cited Chamber of 
Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, where the Court stated, 
“When a federal law contains an express preemption clause, we ‘focus on 
the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best 
evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.’”82  Based upon the narrow 
 
 73. Id. at 1953-54. 
 74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See generally Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1938. 
 77. Id. at 1949. 
 78. Id. at 1954. 
 79. See id. at 1946, 1951. 
 80. See id. at 1949, 1954. 
 81. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1946. 
 82. Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1977 (2011) 
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993)). 
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reading of the text of the definition of “state” in § 101(52), the Court 
concluded that the definition only excludes Puerto Rico from defining who 
may be a debtor, but does not exclude Puerto Rico from the preemption 
provision.83  The majority did not give much weight to reading the 
Bankruptcy Code as a statutory scheme, and in fact, stated that while, 
“Puerto Rico is not a ‘State’ for purposes of the gateway provision, 
however, says nothing about whether Puerto Rico is a ‘State’ for the other 
provisions of Chapter 9 involving the States.”84  During oral arguments, 
Christopher Landau, the attorney for the petitioners, described the statutory 
scheme of the Bankruptcy Code as a “decision tree.”85  Mr. Landau 
explained that § 903(1) should not be read in isolation, but rather is better 
understood with the “decision tree” explanation.86  This explanation of how 
to read the Bankruptcy code begins with reading the definition provided in § 
101(52).87  After reading that definition, it sends the reader to § 109(c)(2), 
known as the gateway provision, which states that Puerto Rico is not a 
“state” in terms of authorizing municipalities to enter into Chapter 9.88  At 
this point, applying the suggested reasoning, the reader would determine 
that the “gateway”‘ is closed to Puerto Rico.89  Then, when the reader would 
move on to § 903, it would be understood that it does not apply to Puerto 
Rico, because Puerto Rico was barred from passing through the “gateway” 
to Chapter 9.90  By adopting the decision tree explanation, it requires both a 
reading of the text and a consideration of what Congress intended when 
they amended the definition of “state” in 1984.  The dissent’s reading of the 
statutory text adopted the “decision tree” explanation.91  Specifically, the 
dissent considered the purpose of bankruptcy law.92  “Bankruptcy is not a 
one-size-fits-all process.  The Federal Bankruptcy Code sets out specific 
procedures and governing law for each type of entity that seeks bankruptcy 
protection.”93  Additionally, the dissent took into account the impact this 
decision would have on the Commonwealth’s future.94  By finding that 
Congress intended to subject Puerto Rico to the preemption provision, the 
 
 83. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1947. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. 
Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 91. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1949. 
 92. Id. at 1950. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 1954. 
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Commonwealth is left with no choice as to how to restructure their debt, 
except for waiting for the aid to come from Congress.95  As stated: 
Congress could step in to resolve Puerto Rico’s crisis.  But, in the 
interim, the government and people of Puerto Rico should not have 
to wait for possible congressional action to avert the consequences 
of unreliable electricity, transportation, and safe water—
consequences that members of the Executive and Legislature have 
described as a looming ‘humanitarian crisis.’96 
This difference in statutory construction is a display of the distinction 
between textualist and purposivist ideologies.  Notably, this decision raises 
questions as to whether the court would employ a textualist approach in the 
event that there were more harsh results.  However, while the future 
implications of the Court’s decision are not easily identifiable, it is 
important to acknowledge the Court’s choice to employ a strict textualist 
approach to the reading of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The Supreme Court of the United States was faced with a question of 
statutory construction in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental 
Protection Agency.97  In that case, the Court was to determine whether the 
general term of “air pollutant” maintained its general definition throughout 
the operative sections of the statute, or whether a narrower definition 
applied in different sections of the statute.98  The Court held that it was 
reasonable for the EPA to adopt a narrower definition of the term in 
different sections of the statute.99  The Court stated, “As we reiterated the 
same day we decided Massachusetts v. EPA, the presumption of consistent 
usage, ‘readily yields’ to context, and a statutory term—even one defined in 
the statute—’may take on distinct characters from association with distinct 
statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.’”100  In this 
case, the Court considered a similar question, as to whether the exclusion of 
Puerto Rico from Chapter 9 as per the definition of “state” wholly excludes 
it from Chapter 9, or whether Puerto Rico is subject to the preemption 
provision.101  While the cases are not analogous, the questions of statutory 
construction are quite similar.  However, the Court’s decision in Puerto 
Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust differs from the decision in 
Utility Air Regulatory Group in that the majority looked to the provision in 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954. 
 97. 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014). 
 98. See id. at 2439-40. 
 99. Id. at 2442. 
 100. Id. at 2441. 
 101. Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1942. 
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question in an isolated manner and applied the definition, but did not find 
that a narrower definition may apply.102  While the choice to take a 
textualist or purposivist approach is purely ideological, as evidenced by the 
difference in results between the two aforementioned cases, the different 
results can be quite apparent, without much explanation for the differences. 
2. Is the Supreme Court Still Concerned with Federalism 
Surrounding Chapter 9? 
“From the earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the Bankruptcy Clause does not prevent States and 
Territories from enacting their own laws governing the restructuring of 
debts.”103  Congress first enacted legislation in 1934 to govern debts of 
municipalities.104  However, the Supreme Court of the United States struck 
down the initial legislation.105  “In light of the background principles of 
federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck 
down the law on the ground that Congress’ constitutional power over 
bankruptcy did not extend to this context.”106  The Supreme Court was 
concerned with preserving states’ rights when it came to municipal 
bankruptcy.107  In 1934, Congress implemented a bankruptcy law that was 
upheld by the Supreme Court.108  In United States v. Bekins, the Supreme 
Court of the United States considered the new 1934 bankruptcy law.109  
Specifically, the Court stated, “The statute is carefully drawn so as not to 
impinge upon the sovereignty of the State.  The State retains control of its 
fiscal affairs. . .It is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make 
contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental 
power.”110  Notably, the Supreme Court was concerned with preserving 
sovereignty and was not in favor of a wide sweeping preemption, meaning 
that the Court did not want federal bankruptcy law to always preempt state 
laws.111  In Faitoute Iron Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, N.J.,112 the Court 
explained that the municipal bankruptcy laws were not to be so wide 
 
 102. Id. at 1946. 
 103. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 1, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. 
 106. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 1, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing Ashton, 298 U.S. at 529-32). 
 107. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530. 
 108. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1938). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 21, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218). 
 112. 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
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reaching as to supersede state laws regarding restructuring municipal 
debt.113  The Court stated: 
Can it be that a power that was not recognized until 1938, and when 
so recognized, was carefully circumscribed to reserve full freedom 
to the states, has now been completely absorbed by the federal 
government—that a state which. . .has. . ..devised elaborate 
machinery for the autonomous regulation of problems as peculiarly 
local as the fiscal management of its own household, is powerless in 
this field?  We think not.114 
It is the purpose of the Tenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution to establish a division in power between the federal 
government and state governments.115  In analyzing the Tenth Amendment 
in relation to municipal bankruptcy, the Supreme Court has tended to err on 
the side of the states’ rights as mentioned above.116  However, this most 
recent Supreme Court decision raises a question as to whether maintaining 
federalism and reinforcing state sovereignty is still of importance to the 
Supreme Court in relation to municipal bankruptcy. 
The role of federalism was discussed in the arguments of both the 
respondents and the petitioners.117  However, throughout the Court’s 
opinion, these issues of federalism were not addressed; additionally, the 
Court decided to restrict Puerto Rico’s rights and provide no means of 
restructuring its debt with the exception of waiting on congressional 
action.118  Justice Sotomayor raised an interesting question to Matthew 
McGill, the attorney for the respondent, when she asked, “It’s like the Tenth 
Amendment right of States to deal with their municipalities consistent with 
the Constitution.  Where does that leave—you can make uniform-
bankruptcy laws, but nothing about that permits you to impair the rights of 
States so drastically?”119  This question is an important one, questioning 
why Congress can now impinge so greatly upon the rights of Puerto Rico 
without stating an intent to do so, and this decision is against the interest of 
 
 113. Appellate Brief of Appellants at 21, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218). 
 114. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1942). 
 115. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 116. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530; see also Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 508-09. 
 117. See Appellate Brief of Appellants at 16, Franklin California Tax-Free Trust v. 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015) (Nos. 15-1221, 15-1218); see also 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938 
(2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
 118. See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954. 
 119. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (Nos. 15-233, 15-255). 
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federalism as previously stated by the Court as mentioned above.120  Based 
on the Court’s decision, it raises a question as to the state of Puerto Rico’s 
sovereignty. 
3. Puerto Rico’s Future 
The Supreme Court handed down the decision in Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust just days after handing down another 
opinion that had a significant impact on the Commonwealth.121  Days 
earlier, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Puerto Rico v. Sanchez 
Valle,122 in which it held that the double jeopardy clause bars Puerto Rico 
and the United States from both prosecuting a single person for the same 
conduct under equivalent criminal laws.123  The Court’s decision “appears 
to diminish the constitutional stature that the Puerto Rican government 
thought it has had for nearly seven decades.”124  The issue before the Court 
was whether under the dual-sovereignty doctrine, Puerto Rico could 
successively prosecute crimes in violation of Puerto Rico law.125  The 
question does not turn on the ordinary understanding of sovereignty, 
“[r]ather the issue is only whether the prosecutorial powers of the two 
jurisdictions have independent origins—or, said conversely, whether those 
powers derive from the same independent origins.”126  The Court 
determined that Puerto Rico and the United States cannot successively 
prosecute a single defendant for the same crime, because “the oldest roots of 
Puerto Rico’s power to prosecute lie in federal soil.”127  These recent Court 
decisions have made it abundantly clear what the Court believes the role of 
United States territories to be.128  “It is now clear, in the wake of the Court’s 
actions in these cases, that the only way for Puerto Rico to gain an equal 
stature within the U.S. governmental structure is to seek statehood—a 
highly controversial issue among Puerto Ricans.”129  In Puerto Rico v. 
Sanchez Valle, the Court stated that it was not diminishing the self-
 
 120. See, e.g., Ashton, 298 U.S. at 530; see also Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 508-09. 
 121. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes Left to Congress, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 13, 2016, 2:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-puerto-
ricos-debt-woes-left-to-congress/ [hereinafter Denniston, Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes]. 
 122. 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016). 
 123. Id. at 1867-68. 
 124. Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Setback for Puerto Rico’s Independent Powers, 
SCOTUSBLOG (June 9, 2016, 2:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-setback-
for-puerto-ricos-independent-powers/. 
 125. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1867-68 (2016). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See Denniston, Puerto Rico’s Debt Woes, supra note 121. 
 129. Id. 
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governing powers of the Commonwealth.130  The Court in Sanchez-Valle 
described Puerto Rico’s establishment, and drafting of their Constitution, 
noting that the “constitutional developments were of great significance.”131  
However, the implications of the Court’s decision in that case are in fact 
limiting to the Commonwealth, just as the decision in Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust.  The Supreme Court’s decision to 
exclude Puerto Rico from the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of Chapter 9 
leaves Puerto Rico with little to do for itself in order to solve its financial 
crisis.132  As indicated by Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion, without 
access to a debt restructuring process, Puerto Rico is left to wait on 
congressional action.133  More specifically, the dissenting opinion stated, 
“Pre-emption cases may seem like abstract discussions of the appropriate 
balance between state and federal power.  But they have real world 
consequences.  Finding pre-emption here means that a government is left 
powerless and with no legal process to help its 3.5 million citizens.”134  
Based on the Court’s recent decisions regarding Puerto Rico, the future of 
the Commonwealth is uncertain.  What is certain is that the public utility 
companies are in need of restructuring their debts, because without 
adjusting their debts, the Commonwealth will be left without necessities for 
everyday life. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As quoted earlier, Justice Scalia said, “Congress. . . does not alter the 
fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary 
provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”135  
However, it appears that Congress did alter the fundamental details of 
municipal bankruptcy for Puerto Rico, in a provision that they provided 
little explanation for.136  As a result, the Court was faced with the issue of 
determining which reading of the statutory scheme Congress intended.137  
The Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust has a significant impact on the future of 
the public utility companies in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.138  The 
Court determined that while Puerto Rico is excluded from Chapter 9 and 
cannot authorize its municipalities to file for bankruptcy, the 
 
 130. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874. 
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 132. See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1954. 
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 136. See Puerto Rico, 136 S. Ct. at 1953. 
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Commonwealth is also preempted from creating its own bankruptcy laws in 
order for the municipalities to restructure their debts.139  The Court found 
that the amended definition of “state” to exclude Puerto Rico from defining 
who may be a debtor was not so broad as to exclude Puerto Rico from the 
preemption provision.140  As a result of the Court’s decision, the 
Commonwealth is now limited to waiting on congressional action for relief 
from its debts.141 
 
BRITTNEY E. CIARLO 
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